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ABSTRACT
A model of interest rate movements in response to new information on
the money stock is developed.The model, which incorporates several
earlier approaches as special cases, makes explicit the manner in which
estimated interest rate responses to money surprises depend on the rela-
tive variances of nominal andrealdisturbances, as well as on the moxie-







Recent empirical evidence leaves little doubt thatanticipated real
rates of return on a wide variety of assets are affected by the Federal
Reserve's weekly release of its latest estimates of themoney supply.
The positive co-movements of nominal interest rates and the value of the
dollar, together with the negative co-movements of nominal interest
rates and both commodity and stock prices are inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis that the responses are solely due to variations in the expected
rate of inflation.2 Lagging behind the accumulation of empirical evi-
dence has been the development of theoretical models which arecapable
of explicitly modelling the determinants of theresponse coefficients
measured in the empirical work. The need for such explicit models is
particularly important given the apparent shifts in parameters which the
empirical work has found to coincide with changes in Federal Reserve
policy.3
While several heuristic explanations for the asset priceresponses to
money announcements have been offered (Cornell(1983) provides a survey
),allthe existing models in this area have tended to treat only a sub-
set of the competing hypotheses.For example, Urich (1983), Walsh
(1983), Nichols, Small, and Webster (1983), Roley and Walsh (1983), and
Campbell (1984) construct models of weekly interest rate determination
under the assumption that the aggregate price level is fixed. These
models have focused on the interest rate responses as real raterespon-
—1—ses to changes in expected future money demand relative to expected fu-
ture money supply.
Roley and Walsh (1983) also construct a flexible price model in which
all observed interest rate movements are due to revisions in expected
inflation. Loeys (1983) incorporates sluggish price adjustment by as-
suming prices are fixed for a constant number of periods and completely
flexible thereafter. Engle and Frankel (1984) and Hardouvelis (1985)
also model the sluggish adjustment of the aggregate price level in mod-
els of the joint response of interest rates and exchange rates to money
surprises. However, they assume the equilibrium price level is deter-
mined by purchasing power parity and that uncovered interest parity
holds. By further taking the foreign price level and nominal interest
rate to be constant, the relevance of their models to an understanding
of the short-run response of U.S. interest rates to weekly announcements
of the U.S. money stock may be questioned.In addition, neither of
these two models explicitly characterizes the behavior of the Federal
Reserve, afactoremphasized in most of the literature in this area.
Engle and Frankel (1984) and Hardouvelis (1985) also assume the
long-run equilibrium real rate of interest is constant. Any movements
of distant future rates must therefore, by definition, be due to changes
in expected inflation, and they cannot analyze the real activity hy-
pothesis as modelled by Siegel (1985). Under this hypothesis, a money
announcement provides information on real shocks to the economy which
produce changes in the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest.
-2-The present paper develops a specific model of the interestrate re-
sponse to the new information contained in the weekly money announce-
ment. The extent to which interest rates adjust to new informationon
the money. stock is shown to depend on themonetary authorityts policy
behavior, as well as the credibility of its policy, the properties char-
acterizing the behavior of the aggregate price level, and the variance
of nominal disturbances relative to real disturbances.
II. The Model
Since an interest rate such as the federal funds rate withonly a one
day maturity responds to money announcements,' it is useful to basea
model of the announcement effect on a model of the market for bankre-
serves. Suppose that the demand for reserves by banksarisesfrom the
existence of a binding reserve requirement on deposits. Underlagged
reserve accounting, as was in effect over the sample period used in most
of the empirical studies cited earlier,rr k + m2, where rr is the
log of required reserves during week t andm_2 is the log of the money
supply during week t-2.5
The supply of reserves consists of nonborrowed reserves(NBRt) plus
borrowed reserves (BRt).Equilibrium in the market for reserves re-
quires banks to be satisfied with the composition of total reserves be-
tween borrowed and nonborrowed reserves. This composition is determined
by the Federal Reserve. Given the manner in which discount window bor-
rowing is administered,6 bank borrowing will depend on both the current
federal funds rate, i, and the expected future value of this short-term
-3-interest rate.7 A rise in current borrowing by anindividual bank in-
creases the implicit cost of future borrowing. Thus,if the interest
rate is expected to be high next period, so thatthe profitability of
borrowing at the discount window is expected tobe high, individual
banks may reduce current borrowing in order to increase accessto the
window next period. The desired reserve composition isassumed to be
given by equation (1):
nbr -rr
- + + Vt (1)
where nbr =ln(NBR)and.it÷i is the expectation,conditional on time t
information, of t+l The disturbance term is assumed to be serially
uncorrelated with mean zero. -
Using(1),
='[rr
-nbr+ o + 2t1t+1 + vt]. (2)
Equation (2) holds under either lagged or contemporaneousreserve ac-
counting. Prior to a money announcement, market participantsknow i -
-1 . -1
Eo+2t1t+1] [rr.-nbr +v]. The weeklyannouncement may lead
to revisions in forecasts about rr, nbr, or v (underlagged reserve
accounting, -aggregate required reserves, rr =k+ m_2 become known
exactly),but, given -+1'isunaffected by these revisions as it
depends, from (2), only on the linear combination rr_nbrt+vtwhich was
already known.9
Let tz denote the revision in a variable z that resultsfrom the an-
nouncement in weekof m_2. Under a federal funds operating proce-
-4-dure, the monetary authority keeps i fixed during the settlementweek,
and nbr adjusts so that Li =0.Under a nonborrowed reserves operat-
ing procedure, nbr is kept fixed and, from (2),
=12tit÷1. (3)
Thus, the current short rate responds if and only if the announcement
leads to a revision in expectations of the future short rate. Todeter-
mine the remainder of the model must be specified.
The demand for real money balances is taken to be adecreasing func-
tion of the nominal rate of interest and an increasing function of real
permanent income:
m_p=o ai+y+u (4)
where Pt is the log of the price level and y is realpermanent income.
The assumptions made concerning the disturbance termu are very impor-
tant, particularly since evidence presented in Roley and Walsh (1984) of
a positive contemporaneous correlation between money and interest rates
using weekly data suggests that demand shifts, as opposed to supply
shifts, play a major role in observed short-run interest rate andmoney
stock movements.11 To capture the notion thatmoney demand shocks have
both permanent and transitory components, it is assumed that
u. =u1+ - (5)
where c is a white noise disturbance term with variance .Theperma-
nent component of any shock is equal to (l-)Et, while represents
the transitory component.'2
-5-Assuming permanent income is equal to the rational expectationof the
present discounted value of future income suggeststhat y should be
modelled as a random walk:
v=v +P. (6) t t-l t
where tP is a serially uncorrelated mean zero random variable.
From (4), =a'[ao_mt++pt++Y+j++j1.Taking expectations,
=a[ac-mt+±
+ + ++±1 (7)
In response to a money announcement, (7) implies
-
= (8)





Equation -(9) is useful in illustrating the various factorsdifferent
authors have emphasized in explaining the effect of announcements on in-
terest rates. For example, Siegel (1985) can be viewed as focusing on
the real income shocks affecting the equilibrium real rate of interest
through the term Ifa money surprise is positively correlated
with future real income, interest rates will rise if an unexpectedly
large value of m_2 is announced. Other models haveassumed this term
to be identically zero, in which case, the interest rate responsede-
-6-pends on how new information affects expectations of the future nominal
money supply, future prices, and future disturbances to money demand.
In fixed price models,'3 (9) simplifies to =
Thesemodels have thus emphasized the persistence ofmoney de-
mand disturbances and the monetary authority's policy rulegoverning the
evolution of the nominal money stock.
To complete the specification of a general model of all thefactors
appearing in (9), two additional components are required: a model ofag-
gregate demand and supply to determine the equilibriwn price level and a
model of the perceived behavior of the monetary authority.
Rather than explicitly model aggregate demand and supply in thegoods
market, a shortcut will be taken.A variety of rational expectations
models of an aggregate economy imply equilibria in which theprice level
depends on past and current expected values of both the current and fu-
ture money stock.Since equal changes int+i and u÷., or m÷. and





Zs0 d5I0 b[_5mt÷ -11+t5Y+]
+ (10)
For example, N might be the length of the longest nominalwage contract.
The current price level depends on expectations ofPt formed at times
t-l to t-N since such expectations are imbedded in the current structure
of nominal wages. IfPt is expected to depend on m and futUre values
of the money stock, an equation such as (10) would result. The time
varying term will be discussed below, while is a white noise dis-
turbance.
-7-Rational expectations models which exhibit both static and dynamic
neutrality impose restrictions on the d5 and b coefficients. First,
the neutrality of money implies that proportional changes in the nominal
money supply at all dates raise the pricelevel by the same proportion.
Equation (10) possess this property if and only if
X d b. =1. (11)
Condition (11) is not sufficient to ensure dynamic, or super, neu-
trality. If anticipated future real rates of interest are invariant to
the anticipated path of money, further restrictions are imposed. For
example, equation (10) implies that Pt S not perfectly flexiblesince
it is partially determined by past expectations. However, the past mat-
ters for only N periods so that, from the point of view of period t,
for i..> N iscompletely flexible. Hence, for i > N should be
invarient to the anticipated (as of time t) behavior of the nominal mon-
ey stock. From equation (4), this requires that,for i > N, the solu-
tion for p given by (10) be consistent with
- - u[r+.'+ -+±]+ t+i + (12)
where r' is the equilibrium real rate of interest. For simplicity, it
will be assumed that rt is influenced by the same factors which affect
permanent income, as well as by a transitory disturbance:
=rt+.1
+ 6t+i + -
Thetransitory shock, v, captures factors other than permanent income
which influence r'.15 Equation (12) requires that the b.'s in (10) sat-
isfy
-8-
-b. =a/(l+a)i,j =0,... (13)
Since (13) implies 1b.1, (11) now requires that
d =1. (14)
Finally3 (12) and (13) imply that -E[a/(l+)]r'÷.. The
presence of this term captures the effects of shifts in theequilibrium
real interest rate on the price level.
In order to represent, in the simpliestpossible way, market partici-
pants' expectations about monetary policy, thefollowing assumptions
will be made. First, it is assumed that themonetary authority follows
a monetary aggregates policy in which it tries to achievea targeted
path for the money stock. Let m÷± denote the targetedvalue, as of
time t, form÷.. Second, while the particular control techniques used
to achieve the target path depend on whether a federalfunds or a re-
serve aggregate operating procedure is being used, it is assumedthat
-themonetary authority is expected to achieve its target. Under this
assumption, = Third, it is assumed that the monetary au-
thority is expected to revise its target path for futuremoney in light
of past deviations from target. To maintaina simple structure, it will
be assumed that rn'+. is adjusted inresponse to the new information
obtained in week tbythe release of the data onm2.
Twohypothesesabout the monetary authority's behavior havefigured
prominantly in the analysis of interest rates andmoney announcements.
The first is that the monetary authority acts to offsetany deviation of
-9-money from the target pathwithout changing the long-run growth target.
This hypothesis can be represented by assuming
T i =(l-X)(m2 - m..2)
(15)
where""willbe used to denote an expectation just prior to the week t
announcement of the actual value of m2. The difference m2 m*t2
=
representsthe new information contained in the announcement. Ac-
cording to (15), the monetary authority is expectedto offset deviations
from target at the rate X per .week. As i -*, = --> 0,
so that no revision of the long-run target pathis anticipated.
The second hypothesis often made concerning the monetaryauthority's
behavior is that a deviation from the old target path asrevealed by the
announcement of m2 is an indication that a change in the target growth
rate has occured. This case can be represented by assuming
(16)
where iT is a parameter measuring the fraction of the money surprisethat
gets incorporated into the new target gr.owth rate.
During the sample period used in the empirical work on moneysurpris-
es, the stated goals of the FederalReserve were expresse4 in terms of
ranges for the growth rates of various monetary aggregates.Since these
ranges are changed only every six months,the stated policy of the Fed-
eral Reserve on a week to week basis is more closely represented by (15)
than by (16).. 6 However, a plausible approximation to the public's ex-
pectations of Fed behavior would place some positive probabilityon both
possible adjustment responses to perceived deviationsfrom target. For
example, suppose it is expected with probability qthat the monetary
target path will be adjusted according (15) in which deviations are
- 10 -gradually offset. With probability l-q, however, the growth path is be-
lieved to be adjusted according to (16). In thiscase,
[q(l-X)' + (lq)(i+2)1r]112. (17)
The weight q is then a simple measure of what might be describedas p01-
icy credibility. A high q implies market participants expect the mone-
tary authority to be unlikely to revise the underlying target growth
rate of the money stock.Alternatively, q could be interpreted as a
means of reflecting uncertainty about the monetary authority's policy.
The monetary authority can attempt to achieve its target path for the
money stock by using either the funds rate or nonborrowed reserves as an
operating instrument. If the funds rate is used, equation (7) defines
the required path of If a nonborrowed reserves operating proce-
dure is used, equation (2) defines the path for nbr which is consistent
with the path for the funds rate required by(7) and thetarget path for
the money stock.It is the monetary authority's operating procedure
which provides an important link between the reserve market and themon-
ey market.
III. The Informatfona.l Content of Money Announcements
The weekly announcement by the Federal Reserve provides the market
with the value of m2." Sincer2 was observed during week t-2, and





—11-The new information contained in the announcement of allows only a
particular linear combination of the underlying disturbances, !Pt2
and t3, to be observed. The revisions in themarketts estimates







where the a. are time varying Kalman filtercoeff±c±ents2 with a1 >
0, a2 > 0, and a3 < 0. From (18), a1 +a2 -a3
=1.
While the announcement of m2 does reveal information onthe week
t-2 money demand shock, it does not allow market participants tolearn
exactly sincê.fl_2 is also affected by real shocks to permanentin-
come. Either unpredicted positive shocks toreal income or to money dé-
mand cause m_2 to be larger than anticipated. Because the observation
of t-2 is not sufficient to identify the underlying disturbances, any




Equations (8) and (9) can be used to calculate the responsesof both
anticipated future nominal and real interest rates tothe money an-
nouncement. Details of the derivations are relegated to the appendix.
-12-First, consider the change in the realrate of interest expected to
prevai.l at time t+i with N:
ôalTi2, i ￿ N. (22)
where 6 is the covariance between
permanent income and real interest
rate innovations. Since all contractsin force at time t will haveex-
pired by t+N, the expected real rate fort+i is independent ofany of
the monetary factors such.as X,ir, or the weight q determiningexpecta-
tions of the futuremoney stock. Real rates do respond to realshocks,
and a positive money surprisewould lead to an upward revisionin the
real rate of interest expected in thedistant future if 6 >0.Such is
the case if real aggregate demandshocks dominate so that real income





+ d.1[(i+3)(1_q) -q(l-X)'1/(l+x)]} (23)
where d(i) Z d.,. From (18),d(i) =1for all i ￿ N. Comparing (22)
arid (23), three additional termsappear when N,and all three are
functions of the price adjustment
parameters. As long as prices are not
perfectly flexible, real interest rates will beaffected by monetary
disturbances and the monetaryauthorityts response to those disturbanc-
es.
-13-The second term multiplying i2in(23) is positive and captures the
effect of revisions .in expectations of future moneydemand.Thisterm
is positive since higher money demand will,ceteris paribus, increase
real interest rates until prices have completely adjusted.From the
definition of the a.'s a1 +(l-fla2
-a3
=1- Thus, the
greater the revision in the public'sestimate of cr2, the smaller will
be this term. Since t2 arises from permanentincome and money demand
shocks, the greater the proportion of 't-2attributed to the less
permanent is the shift in moneydemand since -P shocks are completely
permanent while c shocks, are only partially so.This term capturing ex-
pectations about future money demand hasbeen the main focus of emphasis
under the policy anticipations hypothesis. This hypothesisalso empha-
sizes the policy response of the money supplywhich is represented in
the third and fourth terms multipyingin (23).
The third term in (23) is negative and results fromthe change in ex-
pectations about the future money supply.With X <1,a positive money
surprise implies that the money stock willremain above the old target
growth path for several periods, while if (-l-q)r>0,the nominal money
stock is expected to permanently remain above the old target path.This
upward revision in the expected future moneystock lowers, for a given
money demand shock, expected realinterest rates as long as prices are
not able to respond completely. Combining thisand the previous term
shows how the real interest rate response depends on a comparisonof the
revisions in expectations of future money demand and supply.
-14-The last term in (23) enters becausethe real rate of interest de-
pends.on the expected rate of inflation aslong as d.÷l0. This final
term can have either sign and depends
on whether the money supply is ex-
pected to, grow at a different rate thanpreviously C(l-q)ir 0 )oris
expected to return to its old growth path. In thelatter case, in which
the term dominates, the net effect isnegative.
Earlier discussions of themoney announcement effect have all empha-
sized some sort of active policyresponse as central to the response of
interest rates to money surprises. Eitherthe policy authority was as-
suiried to revise its target growthpath so that expectations of inflation
rose, or the monetary authority was assumed to restrictmoney growth
temporarily in order.to return to the target growthpath. As (23) makes
clear, anticipated future real interest ratesare affected by a money
surprise even if A =it = 0.Evenifthe monety authority allows for
whatisakin to base drift withnorevision in the targeted growth
real interest rates will be affected.Because the higher money demand
revealed by a positive money surprise isexpected to be at least par-
tially temporary, while with base drift the risein the nominal money
-supplyis permanent, real rates will be loweruntil prices have adjust-
ed.21 Unless theöa1 term dominates, however, some sort of policy re-
sponse is necessary to explain what appears to be thepositive response
of real rates to positivemoney surprises.
Differentiating the coefficient °-2in (23) with respect to A
shows that the response ofexpected real rates is increasing in A: a
olicy shiftdesigned toreturn the money stock more quickly to the tar-
-15-gj path will increase the sensitivityof real rates to money surprises
if interest rates initially responded positively tosuch surprises.
Since the shift in policy operating procedures by theFederal Reserve in
October, 1979 was generally perceived as a move to keep monetary aggre-
gates closer to the long run growth target,it could be described as a
rise in ).Thiswould then be one possible factor in explaining the
rise in the response of interest rates to money surprisesthat occurred
after October, 1979.22
The observed response of nominal forward rates is the sumof the
change in the relevant expected future real rateand expected future in-
flation. When i ￿ N, Li1 is given by
=[óa1
-q(1-))'X/(l+X)+ (l_q)1T]n_2i ￿ N, (24)
which converges to [6a1 + (l-q)ir]n...2 as Hence,that some weight
be given to the possibility of a revision in the target path (i.e.,
j is not a necessary ment for expectationsof nominal interest
rates several years in the future to move in response to a moneysur-
prise.If the surprise contains any information useful in predicting
changes in the equilibrium real rate of interest, will be nonzero







-16 —Because X has opposing effects on expected inflationand expected
real rates, the net effect of a change in Xon the sensitivity of nomi-
nal rates to money surprises is ambiguous. Ahigher X implies a faster
return to the target path, and this reduces theimpact ofon future
inflation. However, it increases the impacton expected real rates.
For i such that d(i) is small, that is, for smalli or if prices are
very sluggish to adjust, the effect on real interest rates dominates,
and a rise in X will increase theresponse of 1't+i to a money sur-
prise.
Referring back to equation (24), a rise in A can lead toa greater
response of expected future interest rates to money surprises even for i
￿ N as long as 2X +aX2>1.Thus, the increase in long-term interest
rate responses to money surprises which occurred after theOctober 1979
shift in operating procedures is potentially consistentwith market par-
ticipants believing the Federal Reserve would move morequickly to elim-
inate deviations from the targeted growth path. Even forthe expected
interest rate at t+i for large i, it is notnecessary to assume market
participants. believed the Fed was more likely to revise itstarget
growth path in order to explain the greaterresponses found in the em-
pirical studies.
Equations (24) and (25) can be used to determine the effect ofa rise
in q.. Since Fed policy, during the period studied in theempirical mon-
ey announcement literature, was aimed at achieving target growth paths
for the monetary aggregates, q can be interpretedas an index of the
policy's credibility. A high q implies the publicexpects, with high
-17—probability, that deviations from target will be offset. Thus, a rise
in q is a rise in -credibility. Rewriting (24) and (25) as =
b(i)T'it2,
3b(i)/q =-[(l-X)1X/(l+X)+ ii] <0 (26)
for i ￿ N. Since a rise in q reduces the weight given to the possibili-
ty that a money surprise signals a change in the long run rateof infla-
tion, distant expected future interest rates respond less to the newin-
formation contained in the announcement.23
For i < N, the sign of ab(i)/q is ambiguous. If prices are slow to
adjust so that d(l) approximately equals zero, b(l)/q =cz1[31T
-
(l-X)]which is negative for small it. In this case, greater belief in
the monetary authority's commitment to offset money surprises decreases
the response of the current short-term rate24 to the unanticipated com-
ponent of the money announcement.
Equations (23) and (25) also illustrate the manner in which the real
and nominal interest rate responses depend on the a. parameters. Be-
cause the new information contained in the money announcement does not
allow the individual underlying disturbances to be identified, a posi-
tive money surprise is attributed partially to real, permanent income
disturbances and partially to money demand shocks. Most previous models
of the money announcements have considered only the special case in
which the money surprises are caused by money demand shocks t-2' and
the money arinouncement fully reveals st-V In the present framework,
this case is the special one in which a1 =a3
=0,and a2 =1.It
-18-follows immediately from (22) thatexpected future real rates are unaf-
fected: by money surprises. Forlarge 1, equation (24) implies thatex-
pected future nominal interest rates willmove only if the public be-
lieves there is some chance the
monetary authority will revise its tar-
get growth path. For N,the last term in both (23) and(25) becomes
so that real and nominal interestrates depend
only on the permanent component ofany disturbance to money demand.
If money announcements provideany information that is useful in
forecasting future real income, assuggested by Siegel (1985) and Lit-
termari and Weiss (1985),a1 will differ from zero. The Kalmari filter
coefficients will depend on thesample estimates of the variances and
èovariances of the underlyingdisturbances (see Chow (1975)), andwill
generally evolve over time. Unobserved shiftsin the population vari-
ances of these disturbances (a and 2) willcause movements in the
a.'s. For example, suppose the, variance of realshocks rises relative
to that of nominal money demand shocks.Such a structural shift will
cause a1 to rise anda2 to fall. From (23) and (25), the respoise of
both real and nominal interestrates will rise in absolute value. An
increase in the relative importance ofreal shocks will cause interest
rates to become more sensitive tomoney surprises.
V. Conclusions
The simple model developed in thispaper incorporates most of the
competing hypotheses which have been put forward toexplain the positive
response of nominal interest rates to theunanticipatedcomponentof the
-19-Federal Reserve's weekly moneyannouncements.25 By explicitly modelling
these hypotheses, an expression for the responseof current and expected
future short-term real and nominalinterest rates was obtained. The
factors emphasized in earlier modelsof the money announcement effect
become special cases in this more generalframework. The model shows
how empirically estimated interest rate responsesdepend on the speed
with which money supply deviations from target
are offset, the credibil-
ity of such a policy, andtherelative importance of shocks to real,
permanent income andnominalmoney demand.
Feweconomists would claim that weekly variationsin the stock of
money have important effects onmacroeconomic variables of interest.
However, the weekly announcementsof the latest figures on Ml, together
with the availability of survey measuresof expectations about the an-
nouncements, provide an almost ideal •settingfor testing hypotheses
about the responses of asset prices to newinformation. Because the an-
nouncement provides information about a previousweek's money stock, the
new information in the announcementis predetermined with respect to the
subsequent interest rates movements.In addition, the survey seems to
provide a reasonable measure ofthe market's expectations about the an-
nouncements. These properties havemade this a useful setting in which
to examine hypotheses concerningthe role expectations about future pol-
icy play in influencing interestrates. While a great deal of empirical
evidence has been accumulated documentingthe responses of asset prices
to the weekly money surprises overseveral sample periods, the theoreti-
cal modelling of these effects has laggedbehind. The responses seem to
shift with changes in monetary policy,but in order to derive testable
-20-hypotheses about the manner in which various characteristicsof the en-
vironment influence the responses, a moregeneral theoretical framework
than has guided the empirical research to dateseems necessary. This
paper represents a preliminary attempt to provide such a framework.
-21-APPENDIX
Equations (8) and (9) can be evaluated by substitutingfor
+ + From (4)-(6) and (18)-(21), Ay2 +
and + = +Att.2 -t-2
=(1-
sothat
+ + Au1 (1 - (Al)
for all i ￿ 0.
Using (10) and (17),
Am+. -p+







Substituting (Al) and (A2) into (8) yields the expressiàn for
given in equation (25). Note that for i ￿ N, d(i)=1,so that (A2)
simplifies to
{_ao+q(1_X)1[X/(l+aX)]_(l_q)1Ta)1_2.
To evaluate anticipated real rates of interest, it is necessary to
determine the revision in the expected rate of inflation from t+i to
t+i+1:
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-26-Footnotes
1. Recent work documenting theresponse of various asset prices to the
weekly announcement of Ml include Berkinan (1978), Conrad
(1978),
Grossman (1981), Urich (1982), Urich and Wachtel(1982), Roley
(1982, 1983), Shiller, Campbell, andSchoenholtz(1983), Roley and Walsh.(1983, 1984), Cornell (1983), Loeys (1984), andGavinandKar-
amouzis (1984) who examine interest rateresponses, Cornell (1982,
1983), Engle andFrankel(1984), andHardouvelis(l984a) who examine
exchange rates andinterestrates, and Pearce and Roley (1984) who
examine stock prices, andFrankelandHardouvelis(1985) who examine
commodity prices.
2. Such evidence would only be consistentwith real rates remaining
constant if the aggregate price level jumps inresponse to weekly
money announcements.
3. For example, see Roley and Walsh (1983)or Loeys (1984).
4. See, for example, Campbell (1984) forsome empirical evidence.
5. This ignores the existence ofunequal reserve ratios on the various
components of the money stock and assumes excess reservesare equal to zero.
6. See Goodfrjend (1982) for a discussion.
7.Borrowingalso depends on the current andexpectedfuture value of thediscount rate, but this is assumed to beconstant and so will be ignored.
8. To ensure stabiltiy of the forward rationalexpectations solution to
(1), it is assumed that> . Fora fuller analysis of discount
window borrowing and Fede.al Rerve policy,see Goodfriend (1982).
9. This point is analyzed by Nichols andSmall(1984) and Campbell
(1984).
10. This specification differs from that ofNichols, Small, and Webster
(1983) andHardouvelis(1985) who do not include income explicitly
andwhoassume money demand also depends+1 i. The money demand equation assumed here is more standar.j.n Roey and Walsh
(1983), the interest rate in the money demandequationis identi-
fied with a rate of longer maturity than
11. Roley. and Walsh (1984)regress the change in the 3-month Treasury
Bill rate over a settlement week on thecontemporaneous unantici-
pated money stock. The resulting estimated coefficientwas posi-
tive and significant for the October 1979 to October1982 period.
Similar results were found using theten-year constant maturity
Treasury 'security yield.
12. Hardouvelis (1985) uses a similarspecification. However, his
shocks incorporate transitory income shocksas well as money demand
-27-shocks since no income variable is explicitly included in his money
demandequation.
13. The models of Urich (1983), Walsh (1983), Nichols, Small,and Web-
ster (1983), and Roley and Walsh (1983, section II)fall into this
category.
14. This is because the elasticity of money demand with respect to per-
manent income is assumed to be equal to one.
15. Since ô depends on the correlation between permanent incomeand th
real rate of interest, it could be either positive or negative.
16. Roley (1983) presents evidence which shows that the interest rate
response to a money surprise depends onwhether the announcement
places the money stock inside, below, pr above the policy range.
17. Actually, the announcement represents a preliminary estimateof
The evidence in Roley and Walsh (1984) suggests the subse-
qLexLtrevisionsin these preliminary estimates have no effects on
interest rates.
18. This assumption is consistent with empirical evidence thatthe an-
nouncement of the latest figures on the Consumer Price Index have
little impact on interest rates. The release of the Producer price
Index, however, does seem to affect rates. See Roleyand Troll
(1983) and Smirlock (1984)..
19. It is not necessary for the present analysis to derive explicitly
the expectations of. the underlying shocks just prior to the money
announceient.Note that no revision in ei.ther permanent income or
themoney demand shock (u) from period t-3 appearin (18) since,
from (4), the sum of these two is known exactly prior to weekt's
money announcement.
20. See Chow (1975). For an application to the case in whichthe money
supply is measured with error, see Trevor (1984).
21. The second and third terms in (23) become _'(l_d(i))Za2￿ 0.
22. The empirical evidence of increased responses refers tonominal in-
terest rates while (23) gives the real rate response. Asdiscussed
earlier., however, the evidence suggests that the nominal rate move-
ments are also real rate movements. The responses implied bythe
model for nominal rates are considered below.
23. Judd (1984) reports results consistent with this result.After Oc-
tober 182, when the Fed de-ernphasized control of Ml, forward rates
five years out became more sensitive to money surprises. Seealso
Hardouvelis (1984b) and Loeys (1985).
24. Recall from equation (3) that = =
undera nonborrowed reserves operating procedure.
-28-25. The one explanation discussed by Cornell (1983) whichwas not in-
cluded was the uncertainty hypothesis.
-29-